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Recent court cases involving euthanasia appear to be sanctioning the
so-called "right" to end one's life when certain criteria have been met.
There appears to be a trend whereby the courts are allowing the
medical profession to be cooperators in helping to end the lives of
individuals. Criteria which are being used include the following:
those people who mayor may not be suffering from a terminal illness
who repeatedly request death; individuals who have signed a legal
document indicating that certain treatments should either be withheld
or withdrawn which will result in death; or a proxy whom the court
may appoint to speak on behalf of the values of a person who is
unable to speak for himself. Notorious cases such as Karen Quinlan
and Nancy Cruzan who were both diagnosed with Persistent
Vegetative State (PVS) have set certain legal precedents affecting the
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manner in which both individuals and society view the dignity and
life of such individuals. We present a case which bears resemblance
to other well-known cases of individuals diagnosed with PVS which
was brought for review before our Hospital Ethics Committee at LSU
School of Medicine in Shreveport, Louisiana.
"Jane Doe" is a 14-year-old female who one year ago suffered
a severe head injury due to an automobile accident for which she was
not responsible. She has been hospitalized in the Pediatric Intensive
Care Unit (PICU). Due to the severe nature of this accident, Jane has
little, if any, upper brain tissue remaining. Medical experts and
laboratory studies confinn that she is thought to be in a pennanent
vegetative state. She has had further complications of a central
nervous system nature such as m.iddle cerebral artery thrombosis and
shunt infections. Jane is not on a ventilator and she is receiving
nutrition by a feeding tube which was surgically placed in her
stomach. Since there is thought to be little if any upper brain tissue
which is functioning, there is no production of Anti-Diuretic
Honnone (AD H) from the posterior pituitary. Jane is dependent upon
DDAVP (Desmopressin Acetate) which is an Anti-Diuretic Honnone
that she receives twice a day by subcutaneous injection and
withdrawal of this substance would result in rapid dehydration and
death within hours or days. Jane's private insurance has been
depleted; recently, she was transferred to a long-tenn care facility.
The parents are expecting a settlement from the courts based upon
suit filed against the person driving the vehicle which hit their
daughter and resulted in this tragedy. Our Hospital Ethics Committee
met to review this case and address whether or not it would be
ethically appropriate to withdraw DDA VP which would result in
death due to dehydration within hours or days.
It is most relevant to review the neurological status of Jane by
evaluating her brain stem reflexes. The following reflexes were
examined as follows: Pupillary - absent; Corneal - absent; Grimace present; Jaw - present; Spontaneous Eye Motions - present;
Oculocephalic (Doll's Head Maneuver) - absent; Oculovestibular absent; Acousticardiac - absent; Gag and Cough - present;
Esophageal - absent; Ciliospinal - absent; Apnea Test - respiratory
effort present.
Brain stem reflexes evaluating a response to
Oculoauditory, Oculocardiac, and Carotid Sinus were not examined.
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It is thus evident that there is a brain stem function. Given that there
is spontaneous brain stem function, we must assume the presence of a
soul, thereby indicating that we are dealing with a living human
being.
The presence of a soul is known by the operations which are
performed and are detected by effects which can be observed. The
notion of body-soul or matter-form is one which goes back to the
great philosopher and metaphysician, Aristotle, who held that the soul
is the substantial form of the body - the ultimate cause of all living
acts. Its presence is revealed through being and activity. Relying
upon Aristotle's understanding, Christianity has recognized for almost
2,000 years that the soul's powers can be classified into three areas:
rational, sensitive, and vegetative. Since there is only one soul which
is the point of origin of the three powers, any spontaneous evidence
of any of these sets of powers performing operations clearly indicates
that the soul is present. In the case of Jane, it is clear that there are at
least three vegetative operations spontaneously present through the
activity of the brain stem which is verified by the presence of the
following reflexes: Grimace, Jaw, Spontaneous Eye Motions, Gag
and Cough, and the Apnea Test. Because a soul is still present in
Jane, she is a living human being and remains a human person;
consequently, any ethical concerns of withholding or withdrawing
any type(s) of treatment must be subjected to the same moral analysis
which we would use in dealing with any other human life.
Classical moral theology evaluates withholding or
withdrawing treatments in terms of whether or not a particular
treatment is considered to be ethically "ordinary" or "extraordinary".
From an ethical perspective, ordinary treatments offer a reasonable
degree of hope without imposing excessive burdens on the patient;
extraordinary treatments offer no reasonable degree of hope and/or
impose excessive burden on the patient. In the case of Jane, we may
ask whether or not the DDAVP which is keeping her alive is
considered to be ordinary or extraordinary. I believe that DDAVP is
clearly an ethically ordinary means since it has the benefit of keeping
her alive and its cost monthly is a bare minimum. To withdraw
DDAVP would result in death; hence, by removing an ordinary
means of treatment which would knowingly result in death, an act of
passive euthanasia would occur. How many other lives with very
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serious defects like Jane's could also be affected, in that withholding
or withdrawing treatments which are ethically considered to be
ordinary would result in death because either individuals or "society"
does not see dignity or value in the life of someone who is vegetative
or retarded or handicapped and unable to care for himself? How
inhumane it would be to willfully cause death by dehydration in
stopping treatment with DDAVP even if the person cannot
consciously feel it. We must recognize that even when severe
deformities are present in a human being, that life does not lose its
dignity. We must support the right of these individuals to receive
basic medical care - we must support their right to receive medical
treatments which are ethically classified as ordinary, just as we would
expect for ourselves.
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